Abstract Recent research has demonstrated that Democrats and Republicans are divided along religious lines-religiously committed voters (Protestant and Catholic) identify as Republicans, while secularly oriented voters are more likely to be Democrats. This presents an excellent opportunity to test an implication of the Michigan model of party identification-that, in a realigning period, it is young voters who are most likely to reflect the new electoral cleavage. Using the Monitoring the Future archives of over 230,000 surveys administered to high school seniors from 1976 to 1996, I offer evidence that there is a sharp partisan divide defined by religious commitment among youth just on the cusp of obtaining the franchise. Furthermore, data from the National Election Studies confirm that the link between religiosity and Republican Party identification is stronger among younger than older voters.
theories crafted to explain the party system spawned in the 1930s. This article builds on the claim that over the last 2 decades or so, the United States has undergone a period of shifting electoral coalitions that is comparable with the realignment of the New Deal era. I start with the premise that the Republican and Democratic Parties are divided along religious lines. This cleft is not denominational-Catholic versus Protestant-as it has been historically; instead, it is between religiously committed and secularly oriented voters. This new division between the parties presents us with an excellent opportunity to test which elements of theory developed upon observation of the New Deal party system apply to another period of changing electoral coalitions and thus potentially to such eras generally. Specifically, this article tests whether younger voters have been more likely to realign along religious versus secular lines-as the literature on party identification and realignment suggests they should.
Realignment
Electoral realignment has long been a subject of interest to scholars of American politics, which means that the definition of realignment has undergone emendations and amendments over decades of political science research (Burnham 1970; Campbell et al. 1960; Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale 1980; Key 1955 Key , 1959 Pomper 1968; Schattschneider 1960; Sundquist 1983 ). All definitions, however, share the common characteristic of a systematic rearrangement in the supporters of each party. Even as Carmines and Stimson (1989) provide a scathing critique of realignment as a theoretically tractable concept, their alternative theory of "issue evolution" retains the essentials of conventional understandings of realignment. In both frameworks, there are observable changes in mass political behavior as the coalitions composing the Republicans and Democrats shift. The very staying power of the theoretical concept of realignment speaks to the utility of its fundamental premise-that there are periods in American political history when the divisions between the parties are defined in a new way. My intention here is to illuminate one important aspect of the mechanism by which such a change occurs.
Socialization and Party Identification
From its conception, the Michigan model of vote choice has rested heavily on the assumption that party identification (party ID) is stable over a voter's lifetime. Campbell et al. (1960) posited that party ID develops in one's youth and rarely changes. Appropriately for this article, the literature on party ID often compares it with religion-an identity inherited while young, even before an individual is fully aware of the specific beliefs accompanying that identity. In the heyday of political science's behavioral revolution, multiple studies demonstrated that party ID can form in children as early as grade school (Easton and Dennis 1969; Greenstein 1965; Hess and Torney 1967) . Even Fiorina's theory of retrospective voting-which was developed as a challenge to the static Michigan model of voter preference-explicitly incorporates a term to account for the effect of early socialization (Fiorina 1981) .
Building on the assumption that party ID forms in one's youth and persists across the life span, Beck (1974, p. 205 ) outlines a "socialization theory of realignment," which stipulates that, in a realigning period, the new electoral cleavage is most likely to be found among voters just entering the electorate. "They are the ones most likely to break the partisan continuity between past and future." Writing in the 1970s, Beck was only able to conduct a limited test of this idea. A new realignment had to occur to determine whether voters just entering the electorate drive substantial changes in electoral coalitions. More contemporary research suggests the utility of such a test. Carmines and Stimson mention in passing that their analysis of racial attitudes' role in American politics offers "unintended confirmation" of socialization theory (1989, pp. 148-49 )-notable given their criticism of realignment theory in general.
Religion and Realignment
Over roughly the past 2 decades, the American political landscape has undergone the type of electoral shift that warrants a test of the socialization thesis. Considerable evidence has accumulated that, since the early 1980s, America has experienced a realigning trend in partisan orientation that is grounded in religion. Petrocik (1998) has even compared the coalition supporting the contemporary Republican Party with the profile of Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe. The religious schism in American politics today, however, differs from such cleavages in the past. Traditionally, Catholics have been Democrats, and Protestants, Republicans. More recently, evidence has begun to accumulate that denomination has been replaced by religiosity as a major factor dividing the two parties (Wuthnow 1999) . For example, using National Election Studies (NES) data, Layman and Carmines (1997, p. 288) have found that "the influence of doctrinal conservatism on partisanship and presidential vote choice is growing over time," supplanting denominational differences. Layman and Carmines are able to show that, in the United States, religious traditionalism supersedes postmaterialism as an explanation for political orientation. Likewise, Bolce and De Maio (1999) , Kohut et al. (2000) , Leege and Miller and Shanks (1996) all arrive at similar conclusions. This is not to mention the myriad claims made by the punditocracy along the same lines. In short, it has become increasingly clear that, within the American electorate, religiosity and Republicanism go together, a change that represents a new electoral coalition under the GOP tent. Because this change did not occur in the wake of a single critical election, it is most accurately characterized as a "secular" rather than a "critical" realignment (Key 1955 (Key , 1959 .
Religion, the Republican Party, and America's Youth
The first test of whether young people have shifted their partisan allegiances to a greater extent than their elders is to examine the party identification of young people. Is there any evidence of a realignment among voters just entering the electorate?
The data employed in this analysis are from an extensive archive of surveys administered to an annual national sample of roughly 16,000 high school seniors. Known as the Monitoring the Future (MTF) series, it is primarily designed to collect data on the drug and alcohol use of American adolescents. However, in addition to questions about drugs and alcohol, the standard form of the questionnaire asks students a number of questions relevant for this analysis: party ID, religious affiliation, church attendance, and religious salience, as well as a host of sociodemographic measures. The data reported here span from 1976 to 1996, with a total N of over 300,000 (although, because of missing data, the analyses use fewer cases). Because of its enormous size and longitudinal consistency, the MTF represents an unrivaled source of data on the political attitudes of the segment of the population just on the cusp of exercising the franchise.
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As rich as these data are, however, they are not a representative sample of all mature adolescents in the United States. High school dropouts, who constitute roughly 15-20 percent of each age cohort, are not included in the sample. Excluding dropouts undoubtedly introduces bias into the analysis, since we would expect this group to have systematically different political attitudes and religious beliefs from adolescents who stay in school. Nonethe-1. Monitoring the Future is administered to respondents in their schools. Schools, both public and private, are selected to produce a nationally representative sample of high school seniors. If a particular school declines to participate, it is replaced with another that matches its profile. In smaller schools, the whole senior class participates, while in larger schools a representative sample of up to 350 students is used. There are thus two response rates that apply to these data: the rate of the schools and the rate of the individual students. The initial response rate of schools has fluctuated from 1977 (the first year for which this figure is reported) and 1996-starting around 60 percent, increasing in the mid-1980s to roughly 70 percent, and dropping again to 53 percent in 1996. However, when the response rate is calculated by including the replacement schools, it has never dropped below 95 percent. The principal investigators of the Monitoring the Future series note that, if fluctuating response rates lead to selection bias, the results should also fluctuate erratically over time. They do not. Admittedly, there may be a constant selection bias among schools, but, if so, the measurement of trends is unaffected. In contrast to other national surveys, the response rate for individual students has increased from the 1970s to the 1990s-from 77 percent in 1976 to 83 percent in 1996. The most common reason that students are missed is simply their absence from school on the day the questionnaire is administered, as less than 1.5 percent of students explicitly refuse to participate (Johnston, O'Malley, and Bachman 2001, chap. 3). less, the bias from this excluded segment of the population will be constant over time and therefore not affect the reported trends.
Simple descriptive statistics allow us to examine whether there is prima facie evidence for a religious realignment among American adolescents. First, a simple index of Religiosity was created using two religious items asked of MTF respondents: Attendance at Religious Services and Importance of Religion. These measures capture two important dimensions of Religiosity: (1) participation in a religious community, where political cues can be received and reinforced, and (2) salience of religious beliefs. Both have been shown to be significant factors linking religion and political beliefs (Guth and Green 1993; Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988) . With a correlation of r p .58 ( p ! they have been combined in an additive index to simplify the discussion. .001), While warning that such an index "must not be viewed as the single best measure of religiosity across all traditions," Guth and Green (1993, p. 172) write that it nonetheless "is an effective way to simplify analysis." All trends reported here are identical when the two measures are used separately.
As noted by Guth and Green, it would be preferable to have more precise measures of religious belief and behavior. A growing literature has demonstrated the importance of such measures as doctrinal orthodoxy, religious conversion, and religious identity (fundamentalist, etc.) to explain the links between religion and political behavior (Kellstedt and Green 1993; Kohut et al. 2000) . In the absence of more detailed measures, however, these items capture two of the most relevant dimensions of religiosity. Indeed, the relative crudeness of these measures only makes the trends reported here that much more striking. The advantage of these two questions is that they are less idiosyncratic to particular religious traditions than many measures of religious commitment, such as Protestant-oriented questions about biblical inerrancy and being "born again." Testing the claim that religious dedication trumps denomination as an influence on party ID requires measures of religiosity that carry across religious traditions.
The MTF measure of party ID asks respondents "to describe your political preference." They can choose from a range of options: Strong Republican, Weak Republican, Weak Democrat, Strong Democrat, Independent, No Preference, Other, and Don't Know. While this array of choices requires the analyst to exercise a measure of judgment about appropriate coding, none of the results reported here are sensitive to alternative ways of coding party ID. Figure 1 divides respondents according to their Religiosity score and displays the percentage who report identifying as Republicans (whether Strong or Weak). In order to smooth out the trend lines, the figure displays a 3-year moving average. Figure 1 is a succinct display of the growing partisan division on the basis of religiosity. To simplify the presentation, respondents are broken into quartiles according to their Religiosity scores. In the period 1976-78, respondents in the fourth (highest) quartile of Religiosity were only slightly more likely to identify as Republicans than were those in the first quartile (21 percent vs. 15 percent). That 6-point gap widened to 18 points by 1996 (37 percent vs. 19 percent). In support of the assertion that the gap in party ID is defined by religious commitment rather than denominational affiliation, replicating figure 1 for Protestants only and Catholics only shows the trend to be identical in both groups.
The analysis has kept to the admittedly crude distinction between Catholic and Protestant, even though the MTF data do include a slightly more finegrained measure of respondents' religious denomination. Respondents are asked to specify their religious preference among general denominational families such as Baptist, Lutheran, and Presbyterian. Because these religious groups are so broad, it is not possible to classify members of the Protestant denominations into such categories as Evangelical, Fundamentalist, and Mainline, which previous research has shown to have analytical utility. A Baptist, for example, could be any one of the three. Therefore, the best analytical strategy is to differentiate only between Protestants and Catholics.
While these descriptive data provide prima facie evidence of a widening partisan chasm between the most and least religiously committed high school seniors, numerous alternative explanations for the observed trends could be offered. Is it a spurious result stemming from changes in how gender, race, or other variables are related to party identification? To test whether the same finding holds even when controlling for myriad other factors, I have adopted a straightforward econometric strategy. All of the MTF data have been pooled together and, using logistic regression, modeled with the following equation:
There are multiple ways to code party ID, each with its strengths and weaknesses. I have chosen to use a dichotomous measure of party ID (Party ID) because the question at hand is whether respondents identify as Republicans. Using an ordinal scale for party ID is potentially problematic, given the intransitivity in the traditional Michigan measure (Keith et al. 1992 ). An ordinal party ID scale requires coding Independents and those who have no partisan affiliation in relation to Democrats. If, as is typical, Independents are placed in between Republicans and Democrats, it is not clear that a positive coefficient can be interpreted as an increase in the likelihood of Republican identification; it could indicate movement primarily from the Democratic to the Independent column. Nonetheless, any reader who fears that the trends reported here are an artifact of how the dependent variable is coded should be reassured upon learning that the results are substantively identical when alternative ways of coding party ID are employed or different estimators used.
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Among the demographic control variables, Gender and Race are included because of the long-standing observation that both women and African-Americans are more likely to be Democrats than are men and whites. There is a control for living in the South (Live in South) to ensure that any observed trends are not due to the well-documented rise of the GOP in the southern states. The size of the community is included because of evidence that suggests that there is a rural-suburban/urban split in party identification. The addition of variables that measure whether respondents live in a single or two-parent household, or if their mother works outside of the home, controls for a "culturally conservative" worldview at home, which would probably favor the 2. These alternatives include coding party ID on an ordinal scale and using either ordinary least squares (OLS) or ordered logit as estimators. Likewise, the substantive results do not change when the dependent variable is limited only to respondents who report identifying with either the Democrats or Republicans (i.e., Independents and respondents who report that they "don't know" their party ID are coded as missing).
GOP. Parents' education and intention of graduating from college are proxies for socioeconomic status (SES), because of the unsurprising positive relationship between SES and Republican Party ID.
Dummy variables were included to indicate each presidential administration over this time period (with the Carter administration as the excluded category), since a glance at figure 1 suggests that Party ID is affected by who occupies the White House. Controlling for the passage of time (Time) captures any general trend toward or away from Republican Party ID over these 20 years, while including religiosity (Religiosity) accounts for its general effect on party ID irrespective of any changes over time.
The key variable is 3 A positive coefficient would b (Religiosity # Time). 6 suggest that, in spite of the possibly confounding factors included in the model, religiosity became a greater influence on the likelihood of identifying as a Republican from 1976 to 1996. By controlling for the main effects of both variables included in the interaction term, the model presents the interaction with a sizable econometric hurdle to overcome to reach statistical significance. The model also accounts for the observed differences between Protestants and Catholics, and with the interactions between Time and Religious Affiliation, allows for the possibility that the relationship between religious identity and party ID changed over these 20 years. The interactions between the demographic variables and Time also account for any time trends in these other factors (e.g., did women become more likely over these 20 years to identify as Democrats?). To allow for an approximate comparison of the magnitude of each coefficient's impact, all independent variables have been coded on a 0-1 scale. By converting all of the independent variables to the same scale, one can compare the relative impacts of the variables across their entire ranges, a technique recommended by Achen (1982) for linear regression that is adapted here for logit. Also, the standard errors have been calculated using the HuberWhite correction for heteroskedasticity.
The first column of table 1 presents the coefficients. Religiosity # Time, the linchpin for the analysis, is both positive and statistically significant at the .001 level. In other words, even when accounting for a litany of potentially confounding factors, the time trend displayed in figure 1 is borne out. In support of the claim that religiosity has become a major dividing line between the parties, has the largest coefficient of any variable in Religiosity # Time the model (recall that all of the independent variables have been coded on a 0-1 scale). The comparative magnitude of the impact of Religiosity # is confirmed by calculating first differences. Using CLARIFY (Tomz, Time Wittenberg, and King 2000) , each independent variable was set to its mean value. One by one, first differences were computed for the full gamut of independent variables-varying each term from its minimum to its maximum value. Again, has the largest impact, increasing the probReligiosity # Time ability of Republican Party identification (Republican Party ID) by 24 percentage points across its full range. 4 By way of comparison, the next largest impact was for -which leads to a drop of 16 percentage points Black # Time in the probability of Republican Party ID.
A few other results from table 1 warrant comment. There is a general trend of increasing Republican Party ID over the 2 decades, as demonstrated by the positive coefficient for Time. As expected, Protestants are more likely to be Republicans, Catholics less so. But, over time, Catholics have become increasingly likely to identify with the GOP (positive value for Catholic # ), while the coefficient for does not reach statistical Time Protestant # Time significance. Religiosity is positive and statistically significant, but the magnitude of its coefficient pales next to . In sum, it is not Religiosity # Time religiosity itself that has a substantial effect on the likelihood of identifying as a Republican, but the interaction of religiosity and time.
One might still question whether these results are not masking differences between Protestants and Catholics. After all, the claim that there is a cultural chasm in American politics rests on a convergence in the political beliefs of committed Protestants and Catholics, a trend not explicitly incorporated into the models reported thus far. Furthermore, Catholics and Protestants differ in their mean values on the Religiosity index, with Catholics generally scoring higher than mainline Protestants and lower than evangelical Protestants (although it is not clear how these differences affect the relationship between religiosity and party ID for Catholics). To test whether the temporal effect of religiosity is found among Catholics as a group, and, if so, whether the impact is of a comparable magnitude, the same model was applied to a subsample of Catholic respondents only. The second column of table 1 displays the results. The coefficient for is virtually identical to the Religiosity # Time coefficient reported in the model including all respondents, providing further evidence that the religious divide in American politics is based on religious commitment and not denomination.
The reader should be cautioned that there are exceptions to the generalization about the religious-secular divide in American politics. African-Americans, a group with one of the highest rates of religiosity, are almost monolithically Democratic. Jews also overwhelmingly identify with the Democrats. And, of course, both the Protestant and Catholic religious traditions are home to many religiously committed Democrats. Notwithstanding these exceptions, the proposition holds that-generally speaking-religious dedication corresponds with Republican Party ID. It is important also to note that, while the impact of religiosity over time can be characterized as having the largest impact in the models presented, there are other trends in American politics over roughly the same time period that are not accounted for. In particular, the MTF data cannot account for the growing effect racial attitudes, which are themselves correlated with religiosity, have had on party ID since the mid-1960s (Carmines and Stimson 1989) . Nor, of course, can these models tell us the precise causal mechanism by which religiosity and Republican Party ID are linked. It is likely not the case that members of religious groups choose their party identification on the basis of theology per se, although it may be that religiously committed voters adopt a Republican partisan affiliation because they feel that the GOP is more hospitable to their religious beliefs than are the Democrats. But it is also the case that religiously committed voters across denominations share positions on cultural issues like gender roles, abortion, and homosexuality that have risen on the American political agenda over the past 2 decades.
These caveats, however, do not diminish the fact that the data from MTF provide clear evidence for the increasing relationship between religiosity and Republican Party ID among high school seniors. These data are thus consistent with the long-standing claim that, in a period of electoral realignment, younger voters will have their partisanship defined by the contours of the new cleavage. The causal process of electoral change implied here, therefore, is one of population replacement rather than individual conversion. That is, the growing ranks of the religiously committed among Republican identifiers is not because voters switch from another affiliation to Republican Party ID, but because as new voters adopt a party affiliation, they do so in accordance with the religioussecular divide. Consequently, an observable implication is that young voters should be more likely than their elders to reflect the partisan divide defined by religiosity. Testing that claim requires comparing voters of different ages.
Religion and Republican Party Identification among All Americans
To test the hypothesis that, in a realigning period, the new electoral cleavage is reflected more among the young than the old, I employ data from the National Election Studies for the period 1980-98. 5 It is over this time period that the NES has included questions on religion that most closely mirror MTF's questions. The NES has long asked respondents about their frequency of attendance at religious services, but it was only in 1980 that the questionnaire 5. Overall response rates for the National Election Studies for the period 1980-98 are as follows : 1980, 71.8 percent; 1984, 72.1 percent; 1986, 67.7 percent; 1988, 70.5 percent; 1990, 70.6 percent; 1992, 74.0 percent; 1994, 72.1 percent; 1996, 71.0 percent; 1998, 63 .9 percent. Response rates up to 1994 can be found at http://www.umich.edu/˜nes/studyres/datainfo/dataqual.htm#tab1. The rates for subsequent years were supplied by personal correspondence with NES staff. first inquired about the importance of religion in the respondent's life. While the question used is not identical to the wording used by MTF, it is very similar. (See the appendix for a comparison of the questions used by the two surveys.) As with the MTF series, I have again constructed an additive index of Religiosity by combining the measures for religious service attendance and the salience of religion. 6 The two items correlate at 7 In later .47 ( p ! .001). years, the NES has included a more detailed battery of questions about religion. Even if they were included across the entire span of time in question, though, they are generally only appropriate for Protestants and thus inadequate to test for similarities between Catholics and Protestants.
The MTF and NES models are as alike as possible. To that end, the equation for the NES model looks very similar to its MTF counterpart: ϩb (Age # Religiosity) ϩ e.
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As with the above models, the dependent variable is dichotomous, and so again logistic regression is employed. 8 The demographic variables match those used in the MTF model as closely as possible, although there are obviously controls that are appropriate for adolescents but not applicable to adults. Thus, rather than parental educational levels, the respondent's own education level is included. Similarly, there is no need to control for intention to attend college. The NES also has a slightly less precise measure of the type of community (Urban, Suburban, Rural) in which the respondent lives, not differentiating between types of suburbs as does the MTF.
As has been discussed above, because of the broad denominational cate-6. Note that a minor wording change was made in the NES question about frequency of religious service attendance in 1990. See the appendix for details. 7. The correlation is probably lower than with the MTF items because of the unique way the NES inquires about religious salience. First, respondents are asked whether they consider religion to be an important part of their life. If they answer yes, they are then asked how much guidance religion provides them. The result is a measure that performs better at differentiating respondents at the end-points of the scale than in the middle (Guth and Green 1993) . The imperfection of this measure only underscores the need for the measure to be supplemented with a second measure of religiosity. (Kohut et al. 2000; Leege and Kellstedt 1993) , 9 especially in the wake of the rise of the Christian Right as a force in American elections.
In order to test the central claim of this article-that young voters are more likely to align along religious lines than voters socialized in an earlier era-the model includes an interaction term for Age and Religiosity (b 9 ). Because the effect of Religiosity on Republican Party ID is positive, the interaction between Age and Religiosity is expected to be negative. In other words, the effect of Religiosity on Republican Party ID should decrease with age. The effect of age (b 8 ) is also included in the model, to account for any general life-cycle effects on party ID. As shown in model 1 of table 2, the interaction between Age and Religiosity is negative and statistically significant
In com-( p ! .01). parison with other variables, its impact of 14 percentage points ranks with age, Protestant religious affiliation, and the general impact of religiosity. Note also that is significant and positive, White Conservative Protestant # Time consistent with the conventional wisdom that the past 2 decades have seen voters aligned with the Christian Right become an important constituency of the Republican Party.
I concede that reasonable objections can be raised to my interpretation of the Age-Religiosity interaction. It might be that, because religiosity increases with age, being religious while young is simply an indicator of cultural conservatism that correlates with Republican Party ID. (However, this is still partial confirmation that the Republican Party is home to religiously committed voters.) And even if spuriousness is not a problem, I must nevertheless acknowledge that the interaction between Age and Religiosity is not a full test of the hypothesis at hand. Theory actually leads to the prediction that (a) age and religiosity are negatively related to party ID and (b) that negative relationship increases over time. In other words, as time progresses, we should 9. Complicating the process of classifying respondents' faiths from 1980 to 1998, the NES changed its denominational classifications in 1990. Details about how specific denominations are coded can be found in the appendix. In particular, note that "White Conservative Protestant" is not an entirely accurate label. Some of the denominations included in this category, like LatterDay Saints, are not technically "Protestants." A more accurate term might be "Conservative NonCatholic Christians," but that would be rather unwieldy. Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Live Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5 expect to see the relationship between youth and religiosity become an ever stronger predictor of Republican Party ID. Operationally, this can be modeled with a triple interaction term: Because the effect Age # Religiosity # Time. of is negative, if the effect of time is to increase that Age # Religiosity relationship (i.e., the interactive effect of time is positive), the coefficient for is expected to be negative. Model 2 of table 2 Age # Religiosity # Time includes the same variables as model 1 with the addition of Age # In this model, the interaction between Age and ReligiReligiosity # Time. osity does not reach statistical significance, while the coefficient for the interaction of Age, Religiosity, and Time does. Not only is it statistically significant, substantively it is the single largest coefficient in the whole model-with a first difference of 24.8 percentage points from its minimum to maximum value.
As compared with , the impact of Age # Religiosity Age # seems more impervious to the charge of spuriousness. Religiosity # Time While there is a clear positive relationship between Age and Religiosity, which in turn might spuriously produce the negative coefficient for the Age-Religiosity interaction, there is no reason to expect age to have become a greater predictor of religiosity during the period 1980-98. 10 To demonstrate the substantive impact of I Age # Religiosity # Time, have generated the predicted probability of Republican Party ID. Figure 2 displays the predicted probability of Republican Party ID for two 18-yearolds in every year of the NES from 1980 to 1998. The other independent variables have been set so that the reported results are for a white conservative Protestant male who lives outside of the South in a suburb and has attended "Some College" (the mean level of education). These hypothetical 18-yearolds only differ in their level of Religiosity, with one at the maximum level, the other at the minimum. In 1980, the gap in Republican ID between the most and least religious is about 12 percentage points. By 1998, the difference more than doubles to 27 percentage points.
But is this gap greater than what is observed among older voters over the same period? Figure 3 demonstrates that, as predicted, it is. Here we see the results for a replication of the process used to produce figure 2, only with age set to 60 years of age rather than 18. Instead of the widening gap observed in figure 2, we see one that shrinks slightly, from 15 to 12 percentage points. Perhaps the starkest contrast is between respondents who are of maximum religiosity. In 1980, a maximally religious 18-year-old was 8 percentage points 10. To ensure that these results are not an artifact of using a dichotomous measure of party ID, I again reestimated the model after coding the dependent variable in different ways. As with the MTF results, if the dependent variable is coded as an ordinal variable and estimated using OLS or ordered logit, the results do not change substantively. The same holds if the dependent variable is coded so that Independents and respondents who express no party identification are coded as missing. In each model, remains significant at Again, genAge # Religiosity # Time p ! .05. erating predicted probabilities confirms that has the largest impact Age # Religiosity # Time of any variable in all of these models. less likely than someone 42 years his senior to be a Republican (29.5 percent vs. 37.1 percent). By 1998, that situation had reversed-it is now the highly religious 18-year-old who is 12 percentage points more likely to identify with the Republican Party (63.3 percent vs. 51.6 percent).
Other Potential Explanations
An alternative explanation for the growing relationship between religiosity and Republican Party ID is that it is an artifact of ideologically conservative voters-who are also religiously committed-increasingly coming to identify as Republicans. Abramowitz and Saunders (1998) provide evidence that from 1976 to 1994, ideological conservatives and liberals divided along partisan lines. While it is problematic to claim that ideology exogenously affects party identification, a partial test of the claim that religiosity is just ideology by another name can be made by simply including a measure of conservatism (and its interaction with time) in the model predicting Republican Party ID. 11. Respondents are asked to place themselves on a 7-point scale, from extremely liberal to extremely conservative For this analysis, ideology was coded as a dichotomous variable for Model 3 of table 2 displays coefficients for a model that includes the measure of conservative ideology (Conservative), as well as .
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Conservative # Time Not surprising, conservatism is strongly and significantly related to Republican Party ID. In addition, there is a positive and significant relationship between and identifying as a Republican. In sum, these data sugConservative # Time gest that conservatism and Republicanism are related and that that relationship has increased in strength from 1980 to 1998. Notwithstanding this trend, however, the coefficient for increases slightly (from Age # Religiosity # Time Ϫ1.98 to Ϫ2.27). It remains the largest coefficient in magnitude, and it is still statistically significant at the .001 level.
As mentioned above, another rival explanation for the trends displayed here is that religiosity is really a proxy for racially and socially conservative policy preferences. Fortunately, the NES allows for a partial test of this claim, as consistent questions on these matters have been included across the appropriate range of time. On the subject of race, NES respondents are asked to place themselves on a 7-point scale regarding their opinion on governmental assistance to African Americans. At the ends of the scale are "Government should help blacks" (1) and "Blacks should help themselves" (7).
13 This scale-Racial Conservatism-as well as its interaction with Time has been included in the model. whether respondents described themselves as conservative, or more precisely, if they chose "Extremely conservative," "Conservative," or "Slightly conservative." 12. Other models not shown include among the independent varAge # Conservative # Time iables, but this term is nowhere near statistical significance, and so it has been omitted. 13. In years prior to 1986, the question referred to "Blacks and other minority groups."
On the subject of opinion on gender-related issues, the NES has asked two questions consistently from 1980 to 1998. The first is again a 7-point scale on the subject of women's role in society-ranging from "Women and men should have an equal role" (1) to "Women's place is in the home" (7). The second is a question regarding abortion. Respondents are asked to select which of the following statements most closely matches their opinion (responses coded as indicated): 1) By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice. 2) The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman's life, but only after the need for the abortion has been clearly established.
3) The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest, or when the woman's life is in danger. 4) By law, abortion should never be permitted.
These two items were added together to form an index of Social Conservatism, which was also interacted with Time.
14 Note that the results are substantively identical when the two measures are included separately.
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The results are reported in model 4 of table 2. As expected, Racial Conservatism and Social Conservatism are both positive and statistically (as well as substantively) significant, as are their interactions with Time. We do observe a slight drop-off in the magnitude of (from Ϫ2.27 Age # Religiosity # Time to Ϫ1.84) but no change in its statistical significance. In this specification, only one variable--exceeds it in absolute Black Protestant # Time magnitude.
Model 5 of table 2 presents the results when both ideology and the measures of Racial Conservatism and Social Conservatism are included in the same model. This equation is a rough cut only, as it is certainly the case that the causal relationships between ideology, attitudes, religiosity, and party ID are far more complex than represented here. In addition, the measures of both Racial Conservatism and Social Conservatism are less than ideal, potentially clouding their impact. Nonetheless, this equation suggests that religiosity does have an impact on party ID over and above these other factors, as Age # retains its predictive power even when items that are Religiosity # Time undoubtedly correlated with the growing link between religiosity and Republican Party ID accompany it in the model.
To summarize this section, analysis of NES data clearly confirms the trends observed in the MTF time series. First, religious commitment has been re-
Here
The questions for Ideology, Racial Conservatism, Abortion, and r p .30, p ! .001. Women's Role in Society are variables vcf0803, vcf0830, vcf0838, and vcf0834 in the NES cumulative file. 15. As with Ideology, interactions between these measures, Age, and Time were constructed. None approach statistical significance, and so they are omitted from the model. placing denomination as a dividing line between the parties. Second, this trend is found primarily among younger voters-precisely what is predicted by socialization theory. Further, the NES models go beyond the MTF results by demonstrating that the impact of religious dedication over time is not simply a function of conservative ideology or attitudes regarding race and gender.
The Present as Prologue
The findings reported here only matter if there is any long-term significance to the fact that voters entering the electorate have been socialized in an era when religious commitment and party identification are so tightly linked. Two different sources of data suggest that there is such a significance. First, panel data on parents and their children spanning from 1965 to 1982 lead Jennings and Markus (1984) to conclude that party identification is solidified in early adulthood. Miller and Shanks (1996) concur, given their analysis of cumulative NES surveys. Party ID forms in one's youth and is the prime predictor of how the American voter marks her ballot. Furthermore, 50 years of political behavior research confirms the enduring primacy of party identification in determining how Americans vote (Bartels 2000) .
Of course, we cannot know how long the religiously based cleavage reported here will persist. New issues will inevitably rise in salience, once again causing a shift in the underlying factors driving identification with the Democrats and Republicans. However, because this type of shift is relatively rare and the trend reported here is both strong and consistent over time, we should anticipate that the religious-secular divide will endure into the foreseeable future. When classifying Protestant denominations, it is unclear whether to classify respondents who report that they are "Christian" or "Protestant" or "Interdenominational Protestant" as Conservative or Mainline Protestants. Some scholars use measures of religious beliefs or behavior to assign these "generic Protestants" to one category or another. Such an analytic strategy is not possible in this analysis because these measures were not included in the NES in every year from 1980 to 1998. Even if they were available, however, it would still be problematic to use measures highly correlated with the critical independent variable-Religiosity-to classify another independent variable. To ensure that the results reported here are not dependent on how these respondents are classified, I have compared models where all generic Protestants are coded as Conservative and where they are coded as Mainline. In every case, results are virtually identical across the models. Results are available upon request.
